I have a good bit of experience as an emergency management planner; I spent time planning for the NYC Office of Emergency Management, some experience in communications planning and strategy, and I’m currently learning about health care emergency planning. For me, the H1N1 virus just turns out to be good timing; more actual experience for my resume and career development. Anyone who knows anything about Emergency Management will tell you the best way to learn how a plan actually works is to watch it in action. For me, H1N1 represents Pandemic Flu planning 101 with the added bonus of being in a health care setting in Queens, NY, the site of the largest cluster of H1N1 in the country.
So now here we sit, a solid 2 months into a pretty notable flu outbreak – the kind of outbreak we talk about in Emergency Management circles all the time, even if it isn’t a sexy global pandemic (although, according to Japan it might global) – and activities in Queens seem so isolated, it’s like the rest of the city (if not the Country) thinks we’re overreacting. Some of the safety measures that should be automatic with this kind of fast-spreading virus, like forward triage and proper use of PPE (personal protective equipment, like masks and face shields), are being met with resistance within our own healthcare community. Indeed, only a handful of hospitals in Queens are even setting up forward triage to separate out those patients with flu symptoms and isolate them from the other patients entering the facility. So what did we do all that planning for?
What kind of message does it send when healthcare professionals and public health officials have to be talked into activating the plans they paid big money to write? If history does repeat itself here, we can expect that mostly-localized outbreak we’re experiencing in New York City and in other smaller pockets across the globe, to come back with a vengeance in the fall. What then? I see us putting small Band-Aids on the issue now, but what happens when the issue gets bigger, more widespread? Are we doing enough in this small outbreak to prepare for the possibility of a larger outbreak? My view point is admittedly limited, but I’m not so sure…
Management of this event obviously hasn’t been perfect, but Emergency Management is never perfect. There have been the usual issues, identifying critical assets, obtaining and stocking supplies, and gaps in expectations for the Citywide stockpile (have you been fit-tested for a Kimberly Clark N95 mask, ‘cause the stockpile doesn’t have the 3M primarily used in a healthcare setting). But we don’t need to be perfect. We just need to set better expectations.
There has been a lot of disconnect in citywide communications which could be setting better expectations for the public as well as for healthcare providers and facilities. We are in a unique position to identify gaps now that could become complete road blocks later; not an opportunity often had in Emergency Management. I just don’t see us taking a realistic look at this from a preparedness point of view. I don’t see us taking advantage of the opportunity being given.
So now here we sit, a solid 2 months into a pretty notable flu outbreak – the kind of outbreak we talk about in Emergency Management circles all the time, even if it isn’t a sexy global pandemic (although, according to Japan it might global) – and activities in Queens seem so isolated, it’s like the rest of the city (if not the Country) thinks we’re overreacting. Some of the safety measures that should be automatic with this kind of fast-spreading virus, like forward triage and proper use of PPE (personal protective equipment, like masks and face shields), are being met with resistance within our own healthcare community. Indeed, only a handful of hospitals in Queens are even setting up forward triage to separate out those patients with flu symptoms and isolate them from the other patients entering the facility. So what did we do all that planning for?
What kind of message does it send when healthcare professionals and public health officials have to be talked into activating the plans they paid big money to write? If history does repeat itself here, we can expect that mostly-localized outbreak we’re experiencing in New York City and in other smaller pockets across the globe, to come back with a vengeance in the fall. What then? I see us putting small Band-Aids on the issue now, but what happens when the issue gets bigger, more widespread? Are we doing enough in this small outbreak to prepare for the possibility of a larger outbreak? My view point is admittedly limited, but I’m not so sure…
Management of this event obviously hasn’t been perfect, but Emergency Management is never perfect. There have been the usual issues, identifying critical assets, obtaining and stocking supplies, and gaps in expectations for the Citywide stockpile (have you been fit-tested for a Kimberly Clark N95 mask, ‘cause the stockpile doesn’t have the 3M primarily used in a healthcare setting). But we don’t need to be perfect. We just need to set better expectations.
There has been a lot of disconnect in citywide communications which could be setting better expectations for the public as well as for healthcare providers and facilities. We are in a unique position to identify gaps now that could become complete road blocks later; not an opportunity often had in Emergency Management. I just don’t see us taking a realistic look at this from a preparedness point of view. I don’t see us taking advantage of the opportunity being given.
